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The choice of this topic is a curious one, perhaps, for art seems to be such a 
personal creation that even its appreciation may be relative and most of the 
time considered as subjective or reliant on impressions. Whether this idea is 
rightfully founded or not is reviewed in this paper: Is art’s meaning simply 
an impression? Does it come to exist merely because of whims and 
ecstasies? Is the experience of art such that it cannot but be dominated by 
personal ideas? In answering these questions, I present a synthesis of some 
of the works of Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), a Thomist who has 
important insights concerning aesthetic experience.  
 Since the experience of art starts from its causes to the work’s 
appreciation by other people, the progression of this discussion is presented 
as follows: first, the concept of inspiration, to which artists usually attribute 
their creations, is assessed; then the aesthetic experience is reviewed to 
understand art’s qualities; and finally, the purpose and meaning of the 
artwork are examined.  
 
RECOGNISING REALITY THROUGH CREATIVE INTUITION 
 
Most of the time, if not always, artists tell us that they need inspiration for 
them to create an artwork. And when they choose to describe it to us, we 
usually find it hard to get a full picture of what they are saying. Yes, we 
may understand better as the explaining goes on, but it may seem that our 
understanding is only asymptotic to the actuality of the inspiration, that our 
understanding cannot grasp the inspiration in its totality. But one thing is for 
sure, artists will tell us that they feel something when they are inspired. This 
feeling urges them to create their works. Inspiration, then, is so personal that 
it may be deemed as too subjective. We might even be led to immediately 
dismiss it to be solely dependent on the artist. But is this the only 
assessment that we can make on inspiration? What is this “inspiration”? 
In Maritain’s writings on aesthetics, we are told that poetry is what 
urges the human person to translate this experience into an expression, such 
as an artwork. The urge usually follows because, according to him, “the 
intellect [of the human person] is by its nature expressive” (“Poetic 
Experience,” 388). This poetry is not received by way of reasoning but by 
way of affection, for it is “the divination of the spiritual in the things of 
sense, and which expresses itself in the things of sense” (Art and 
Scholasticism, 128). It hints that the experience of poetry is not a material 
connection; it is, rather, spiritual. This does not resolve our question just 
yet, but it makes us see that Maritain’s concept of poetry is somehow 
similar to the inspiration to which artists associate their artworks. To note, 
    Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 82 
the descriptions of both match each other: both are received by way of 
feeling and they pave the way for the creation of the work of art.  
So far, we see a general connection, showing us that inspiration is 
poetry and that poetry is a glimpse of the spiritual dimension of life. The 
trajectory of this investigation is now led to an inquiry on the spiritual 
aspect of things that are sensed. Here, we seem to be faced with a dilemma: 
How can an object of sense, which is supposed to be material and which 
may include inanimate things, be capable of bringing spiritual experiences 
to the human person? A deeper immersion into Maritain’s philosophical 
inquiries, particularly on the existence of God, can guide us to see that this 
is possible and rationally explainable. We can find this answer in one 
discourse where Maritain reviews and continues the discussion of St. 
Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways. 
In his book Approaches to God, Maritain leads us to consider that 
the Five Ways are not separate arguments. Rather, they comprise a 
continuous line of reasoning that makes us better appreciate the presence of 
the Supreme Being and, after we read Maritain, the existence of the world 
as well. This is the fresh contribution of Maritain. Intentional or not, he 
somehow makes the discussion reflexive: that the more we go out of 
ourselves to understand God, the more we understand our existence in the 
world. This resounds particularly when Maritain proposes his addition to the 
Five Ways: “a Sixth Way.” 
In explaining the Sixth Way, Maritain focuses on the concept of 
intuition, which is “the ultimate object to be attained by the intellect, which 
it attains at the summit of natural knowledge” (A Preface to Metaphysics, 
43).1 This is significant because Maritain pulls our attention to knowledge, 
and consequently, to the human person. Here we see that the human person 
is prominently placed in the equation of understanding some of the aspects 
of the existence of God, including the beings that emanate from His 
presence. For Maritain, acquired knowledge follows the Ways, especially 
the argument of final causality. But as we see in his Way, he focuses on 
intuition, a kind of knowledge which is at the very beginning of the process 
of knowing. Let us remember that the Five Ways are also a key in 
understanding existence in general. So, what follows from the arguments of 
the Five Ways: of act and potency, of causation, of necessity and 
contingency, of degrees of perfection, and of final causality? How do we 
know all of these? Maritain answers “with knowledge” that is gained by the 
human person.  
In the tradition of Thomism, knowledge can either be acquired 
through the natural capacity of a being – which brings natural knowledge – 
or through divine revelation, which brings supernatural knowledge.2 The 
distinction between the two has particular significance at this point. It has 
previously been stated that Maritain considers intuition as a natural 
knowledge. However, it must also be noted that he declares it to be “at the 
summit,” thereby implying or acknowledging other kinds of natural 
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knowledge aside from intuition.3 Perhaps, this explains his decision to call 
his addition to the discussion as only “a Sixth Way.” 
Now, we come to examine intuition. As has been said, Maritain 
was deeply influenced by Aquinas. For Aquinas, intuition is an 
understanding that is proportionate to the nature or quiddity of the rational 
being (Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 3b ch. 91). This is too general, still. 
However, it may be noted that, through most of his works, Aquinas uses the 
term “intuition” when he discusses the knowledge possessed by angels.4 He 
mentions it to pertain to human knowledge only when he discusses revealed 
truths.5  He writes that the knowledge of the divine emerges within the 
human person “when the human mind is raised to the perfect intuition of 
things revealed” (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, bk. 4 ch. 1.) With 
this, it is understood that Aquinas regards intuition as more appropriate for 
angels rather than for lower rational beings; intuition for the human person 
is dependable only if revealed truths are fully understood. 
Meanwhile, considering his statement cited earlier which states that 
intuition is at the peak of natural knowledge, Maritain is proposing a 
slightly different concept of intuition. This means that the intuition of a 
person, which is still maintained as a knowledge of the divine, may also be 
known through the contingent world. With reason, we may understand this 
because everything possesses qualities of the Supreme Being but only in 
varying degrees, and the attributes aid to fulfill an activity directed toward a 
final end; this reasoning reminds us of Aquinas’s Fourth and Fifth Ways. 
Indeed, we recognize this synergy among temporal beings because of our 
capacity to know some of the natures of things, which come from the 
Supreme Being. We are capable of knowing it because we also have nature, 
and we are part of the design by which everything operates. This can be 
understood further with Maritain’s concept of connaturality, 6  which he 
draws from Aquinas.7 With this explained, Maritain’s proposition of having 
intuition as “the ultimate object to be attained at the summit of natural 
knowledge” can be interpreted as a knowledge of nature, which is 
constituted by some degrees of divine attributes, that reaches the intellect 
through sense experience. It is through immediate experience or 
connaturality that the human person acknowledges that one is part of the 
greater scheme of things. This perhaps moved Maritain to declare: intuition 
“sets out from being, but from being as it is immediately apprehended when 
the mind first awakes in the sensible world. That is its starting point.” (A 
Preface to Metaphysics, 43).  
It is clear that Aquinas and Maritain consider intuition a little 
differently. But their views are not far apart from each other. While Aquinas 
puts intuition as angelic knowledge, which gives a more perfect 
understanding of existence, Maritain places it at the point where natural 
knowledge and supernatural knowledge meet; where the knowledge from 
experience leads the intellect to ascend to acknowledge higher realities.8  
To set our perspective, it must be noted that Maritain identifies two 
levels of intuition: the pre-philosophic and the philosophic. When intuition 
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reveals itself, it is first felt at the pre-philosophic level, which is concerned 
about connaturality or the “intellectual perceptions of a trans-physical and 
analogous commonality... and the esse (act of existing) of things.” (Knasas, 
“How Thomistic is the Intuition of Being,” 84). However, intuition reaches 
the philosophic level when the subject is inspired to translate the feeling 
into action. This emerges from the appreciation of the manner of existence 
of beings, which inspires the person into an active participation in the 
movement of the world. Strictly speaking, the two levels are distinct from 
each other. However, the link between them cannot be dismissed. 
At the pre-philosophic level, the first intuition is said to be that of 
consciousness. Maritain explains that one does not reason out that he is 
conscious. Rather, the person immediately uses consciousness because he 
feels that he is conscious. The feeling asserts an impact on the person, an 
immediate impact that compels him to think. Thus, Maritain considers this 
as the primitive or wild state of intuition, which  “sprung at the same time as 
[the person’s] birth.”9 (Approaches to God, 72–73). He also traces the origin 
of the intellect and its property of being conscious to understand where, 
from the moment of birth, the mind begins to reach understanding. But he 
does not disregard the observable reality with which the human person, as 
he grows older, deepens his understanding of the world.  
Thus, Maritain reflects further and leads us to a review of the 
development of the consciousness based on two proportions. Following 
Aquinas and Aristotle, Maritain explains the development of the 
consciousness as proportionate to the intellect and to the physical senses of 
the human person. The development in proportion or according to man 
maintains that, as the human person progresses with his engagement with 
the physical world, his understanding of existence also develops; hence, his 
better participation in the activity of the world (73–74). The knowledge 
gained here “are for the most part operations of sense and imagination,” 
which later on will be “sustained and illuminated by the intellect” (Knasas, 
“How Thomistic is the Intuition of Being,” 87–88). Meanwhile, the second 
aspect of the development of the intellect points to being conscious of the 
spiritual nature of the intellect. Thus, the activity of the mind withdraws into 
the realm of ideas; its acquired knowledge is purely intellectual and it rises 
above what are physically sensed and imagined. The developed 
consciousness reaches some ideas on the Supreme Being and His relations 
with the contingent beings.  
The pre-philosophic intuition, therefore, is the knowledge from 
feeling the world. But what now is intuition in the philosophic level? For 
Maritain, the knowledge from feeling is still refined by the human person 
because of his intellect. The feeling is developed into thinking. This 
intuition moves the consciousness by way of examined knowledge to 
further think beyond physical perceptions. Maritain demonstrates this 
proposition by leading us to questions that are logical. This is evident when 
he asks: “Is it possible that that which is thus in the process of thinking... 
should once have been a pure nothing, once did not exist?” (Approaches to 
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God, 74). The metaphysical question, to which his answer is ‘No,’ signals 
that Maritain tries to trace the cause of the existence of the human person, 
and how persons have been caused to operate as such. Observe Maritain’s 
response: “I, who am thinking, have always existed, but not in myself or 
within the limits of my own personality” (Approaches to God, 76). Both the 
question and the answer show that Maritain thinks the rational being has 
been a part of another being with a higher level of existence, a being with 
which all share a certain form of resemblance, but not in the same degree.10 
Understandably, this pre-temporal existence of beings needs to be 
elaborated. But we must already note that Maritain’s question and answer 
already resemble the tendency of the intellect of the human person to 
advance into the intellectual realm to better understand the human person’s 
consciousness. For while the initial bases of knowledge may have been 
physically observable, the realization, which the consciousness reaches, has 
its origin from another being, and indeed belongs to the philosophic level of 
intuition. Hence, the philosophic level of intuition is borne out of the natural 
tendency of the human person to ask, as if he already knows that there is 
still more to understand in reality. In this progression of knowing, the 
tendency of the human person to understand his world and himself is to find 
the rational cause. This observation justifies Maritain’s previous claim that 
intuition is the highest form of natural knowledge, for it is in this level that 
the knowledge of natural beings directs the person to ascend from the 
curiosity of the world to the acknowledgment of higher levels of being.   
At this point, perhaps, we already have an ample amount of 
information to answer our question on what inspiration is: it is an intuition, 
a knowledge from feeling which comes not from the self but from other 
beings in the world. With this perspective, we see a dialectical relation 
between the self and the world, which allows the human person to interpret 
the world as it reveals itself and not as how he wants it to be.  
 
BASES OF AESTHETIC QUALITIES 
 
This interpretation of existence can, of course, be expressed by the human 
person through artwork. We have already seen that inspiration, which 
compels the human person to create an artwork, is a kind of intuition. 
Maritain calls it “poetry.” Let us now observe the creation of an artwork and 
what it is. In “Poetic Experience,” Maritain outlines several considerations 
to appreciate art. He starts with the human person and his capacity to create 
the factors that lead to the creation of an artwork, and concludes with the 
assessment of the being of a work of art.   
The first consideration is for poetry to be expressed through art. 
When one experiences poetry, an urge is born in him to translate what is 
drawn from his experience into something concrete. This is our natural 
inclination to have our ideas overflow into external expression. Admitting 
that the human person has the affinity to communicate, the intention of art 
then is to present a message that is communicable to other human beings. 
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However, we must note that human beings “have a legitimate and 
autonomous transcendental drive for creating and searching for beauty, 
along with, and distinct from, the other human drives to understand the 
truth.” (Kerr, “Deconstruction and Artistic Creation,” 119). This is because 
of the different ways by which the consciousness of each human person 
develops. But it does not mean that art is egotistic since it expresses the self. 
As has been understood, the human intellect is limited and can only 
be conscious of a few aspects of the world. The experience of material 
things also causes moments of feeling, such as suffering and joy. Yes, they 
are personal experiences. However, they do not convey only the being of a 
subject. They also connote the environment, which is not reliant on the 
person. When a person encounters a joyous experience, that person intends 
to prolong the experience by placing his memory into something that is not 
fleeting. The memory definitely is not limited to that person alone. Other 
people, places, and other things are, of course, in it.11 
What, then, is intended to be communicated in an artwork? This 
poetic knowledge, Maritain states, “involves the whole of man, and which 
gives the world to man, which can let him suffer the whole world within 
himself!” (“Poetic Experience,” 392). This means that when poetic 
knowledge occurs in a person, it urges him to express the experience. But he 
cannot own it. Rather than being defined by the artist, art actuates the 
subject as subject. This indicates that this knowledge is so immense that it is 
impossible to be totally expressed. Here, the premium of the possibilities 
brought about by poetry is expressed. It must be understood that, although 
poetry is spiritual in nature, it may cause suffering and joy by way of the 
knowledge that it gives to a person. Maritain reminds us that poetry makes 
the human person exercise his capacity to create or, following the line of 
thought from the Five Ways, to participate in the motion of life.12 But again, 
an artwork can only express poetic knowledge in a limited sense. Its 
meaning appeals first to the intellect of the artist, not by way of logical 
reasoning but by way of inspiration. When the person responds to the 
appeal, he creates art, which for Maritain is reminiscent of the original 
inspiration. This occasion is the natural tendency to return, according to 
Maritain, to art’s origin. With this, it is understood that poetry considers the 
existence not only of consciousness but also of what it is conscious about 
during the experience of poetry. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of this poetic experience, according 
to Maritain, can only be visible during “sleep,” which he refers to as the 
instance when the consciousness escapes the grasp of the physical senses 
and enters the borders of the “sufficient universe” of poetry. (“Poetic 
Experience,” 398-399). His concept of “sleep” does not refer to dosing off 
during the night. Rather, it is the state where the consciousness, still aware 
of the physical realities of the world, reaches farther into the knowledge of 
the spiritual. Indeed, Maritain maintains that poetic knowledge owes its 
birthing to the immediate experience of the sensible realm by way of 
emotion. This emotion, evoked when poetry is translated into art, gives life 
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to the artwork. To explain further, “creative emotion is not a matter of the 
work of art, it is, on the contrary, the form forming this work; it is not 
emotion as a thing, as a given object, but an intuitive and intentional 
emotion, which bears in itself much more than itself” (“Poetic Experience,” 
399-400). This means that the artwork does not convey itself as how it 
materially exists. Rather, it shows us the emotion with which it was made.  
Works of art, then are signs. They lead to a realization of a 
brimming of meanings, as if they were a key to secrets that are not meant to 
be told. This is the promise of artworks.13 This eventual awareness of the 
self is inevitably imperfect, but it is still inspiring, for it can motivate the 
human person to be a better version of himself. Finally, we see the artwork 
as one of a person’s natural expressions of knowledge, in this case, poetic 
knowledge, which does not come from him. This is not his original idea 
because he gets it from something that reveals itself to him. What are 
unique are his perspective and approach to the thing, which are built 
through the development of his consciousness.  
 
WHAT ART GIVES 
 
Maritain writes: “To put forward the misdeeds of the spirit Poetry when it 
has gone astray as a pretext for refusing to acknowledge its rights in the line 
of art, to claim to bring it back to mere technique or to amusement or 
pleasure, would be an unpardonable mistake, and altogether fruitless 
besides.” (Art and Scholasticism, 134). Simply put, Maritain means that the 
intuition of the beauty of life in general should translate into the artwork. 
This indeed is a reminder when we try to look into the purpose of an 
artwork.   
Several considerations still need to be underscored here. Maritain 
stresses that the idea of the artist “is formative of things and not formed by 
them” (Art and Scholasticism, 121). This means that the idea, insofar as it is 
for the creation of art, is not produced by the artist. Instead, artists are 
indebted to other things, particularly to the experience of the spiritual, for 
these ideas. These ideas are formative because they comprise only the 
framework of the process of artistic creation, but not the meaning of it. The 
imperfection of creative ideas is also congruent to the scarce glimpse of 
divine perfection that the artist has. The artwork also has matter, or the 
body, limiting it, making the greater meaning obscure to the eyes, its 
essence ungraspable by the human senses. Thus, the meaning is thwarted by 
the condition of the individual and the creation. This means that a work of 
art can be understood in one way at a certain time, and understood 
differently (e.g., better) at another time.  
The human person must be reminded of his limitations. Art, then, 
must espouse reflection, for the person to struggle to make sense of its 
meaning. The truths that it gives, however limited they may be, must be 
embraced by the person. If we stop and let artworks be understood only in 
the limits of their temporality, this will lead to the “suicide of art” (Art and 
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Scholasticism, 124). For an artist, there is one way to avoid this danger – 
that is, to transcend the temporal conditions. By doing so, he will be able to 
destroy the barriers of materiality, which will induce a new energy to the 
artwork.14  
Meanwhile, for the artist to rightfully create art, he must subscribe 
to a certain kind of asceticism or noble sacrifice. As Maritain avers: “[the 
artist] must pass through spiritual nights, purify his ways ceaselessly, 
voluntarily abandon fertile places for barren regions full of insecurity” (The 
Responsibility of the Artist, 99). Hence, artists must possess humility, 
magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude, temperance, simplicity, and 
ingenuousness – all which are needed for a person to be an artist of the 
world because no human person is meant to be a subject of conceit. With 
this note, it is fitting to underscore Maritain’s forewarnings in the creation 
of artworks: the sin of materialism and artistic morality.  
The sin of materialism subscribes to the problem of imitation. The 
spiritual nature of art is in contrast with “the servile imitation of the 
appearances of nature, since art’s deepest exigency is that the work manifest 
not another thing already made, but the mind itself from which it proceeds” 
(Maritain, Art and Scholasticism and The Frontiers of Poetry). In other 
words, the artwork must not be a mere reproduction of reality. Instead, it 
must reveal the relational nature of the human person with the world. The 
artist must be cautious to avoid the temptation to subscribe to artistic 
morality, which is “depicted as forcing upon man [false] moral obligations” 
(Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, ch 5). This means that the artist 
realigns the criterion of beauty to a selfish intention of glorifying himself 
and his work. This is notorious in the circles or communities of artists. This 
morality usually revolves around three perverted virtues, namely, sincerity, 
purity, and curiosity. 
While there is a genuine kind of sincerity, the sincerity in artistic 
morality glorifies the artist making him incapable of making sound ethical 
judgments. But, of course, the artist is not what art is for. Consider here 
movie stars, who no longer own their lives which they eventually owe to the 
fans and media critics. Another interesting point here is Maritain’s 
scepticism toward sentimental art. He is candid in expressing his disgust 
with the idea that art is boxed within the limits of sharing one’s personal 
thrills and ecstasies, for that violates human nature. Let us remember 
inspiration as something gained through the natural inclination of the 
intellect to gaze out of itself. Thus, to confine the meaning of the artwork to 
the artist is to deny human experience of the world.  
Meanwhile, corrupted purity is the intention of limiting of the 
artwork to the literal portrayal of external realities and occasions. No 
prudence is exercised here, for what is considered pure is the obvious and 
observable in the temporal realm. Here we may be reminded of 
pornography, of which explicit exposures are more inclined to scandal 
rather than to inspire. We should consider that the artist must see beyond the 
facts of the world and see how crude they appear.  
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Lastly, curiosity in artistic morality is curiosity in the extreme sense 
because the tacit belief of people subscribing to this is to have a taste of 
everything to feed their creativity while putting themselves at risk. Those 
artists, who succumb to addiction from the various vices the world has to 
offer, is an example of this. 
In sum, we see that the artwork is a human reaction, a response to 
being conscious of the interrelations of things in the world. This response is 
also meant to communicate a meaning that is not drawn from the artist. We 
realize that the human person is only one aspect of artistic creation, and he 
must never think that he is the one who creates the meaning of artworks. For 




I have discussed how the human person is an artist and how his craft comes 
to be. But how is this related to our theme? As I have mentioned earlier, this 
paper discusses a hermeneutic perspective on the relation of the person and 
the world, using a philosophical lens in the tradition of Thomism. This is 
clearly shown when we investigated the phenomenon of inspiration as a 
principle of artworks. We had seen in this part that inspiration comes not 
from the human person but in his experience of other things in the world – 
and notably, the existence of things that are independent of him and his 
consciousness. In aesthetic experience, this means that the human mind 
should not dominate over other beings in the world; it must not impose 
meaning, neither should it claim that it gives meaning to art. One 
compelling way to appreciate this relation, and to reasonably justify beings 
that are independent of the human intellect, is through the acknowledgment 
of an Ultimate Cause. By understanding how the Supreme Being has 
produced the world, we find a rational explanation for the interrelatedness 
of things in the world: there is connaturality, the intelligent design of things, 
and the power of the human person to recognize all this. All of these have 
bearing in the creation of art, for they are bases for the ethical guidelines in 
aesthetic experience. This marks the relevance of this perspective to our 
time. Remember that art is also a communication, and its message – that 
should reach its audience – must not be contrary to its inspiration, i.e., to the 
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1 Maritain gives only descriptions and distinctions of intuition, and no 
definition, in Approaches to God. However, we may also consider that 
Approaches to God immediately came after the release of A Preface to 
Metaphysics. Hence, it may be safe to assume that there is in fact a continuity in 
the discussion of intuition in the two publications. 
2 Natural knowledge and supernatural knowledge are both pursued by 
the human person because, as Aquinas writes, “the natural desire for 
[knowledge] has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by [the 
Supreme Being].” See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, chs 3 and 7. 
3 In Approaches to God, these other kinds of natural knowledge are 
rarely cited, if not unmentioned at all. But since Maritain has grounded his 
philosophy on Thomism, using Aquinas’s distinctions of knowledge is 
beneficial in understanding Maritain’s position. According to Aquinas, the other 
kinds of natural knowledge are discursive, common sense knowledge, and 
instinctive. Discursive knowledge are our ideas of contingent beings, insofar as 
the latter’s causes are considered (See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 
1, ch 57). This knowledge is understood through a demonstrative discussion of 
the causes, as premises, and effects, as conclusions. Meanwhile, the knowledge, 
borne out of common sense, is what we have from our ability or power, as 
rational beings, to process those that are perceived by the “proper senses” – or 
the physical senses of sight, olfaction, taste, touch, and hearing – for them to be 
identified to a being. The common sense “knows everything apprehended by the 
five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows” (See 
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person is proper to the sense of sight; the scent of his perfume is proper to the 
sense of olfaction; his temperature to the sense of touch; the quality of his voice 
to the sense of hearing; and so on. However, the physical senses do not provide 
the knowledge of attribution of all these qualities to a person. Rather, it is the 
common sense of the intellect that links all these to the human being. The third 
kind of natural knowledge, for Aquinas, is instinctive knowledge or the 
common judgment that the human person shares with the brutes. It is anchored 
on the animals’ sentient power, which tells them what is helpful and what is 
harmful. The difference, however, with the rational being and the other animals 
is that the person can refine judgment with the use of reason, which the brutes 
do not have (See Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, 2, q. 18). 
4  Discussions of Aquinas on intuition can be reviewed in Disputed 
Questions on Truth, Book 3b, 91; vol. 1, qq 2, 4, 8, 9; vol. 2, q 12; vol 3, q. 24; 
in Summa Contra Gentiles, 4, chs 1 and 55; also in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 59; 
I-II, q. 74; II-II, qq 9, 49, 180; and in Questions on the Soul, 7. 
5 On the contrary, supernatural knowledge or revelation is that which 
escapes the grasp of natural reason, but which the human person comes to know 
because they are offered “not as shown to him that he may see it, but as 
expressed in words so that he may hear it.”  This may be considered as direct 
infusion of knowledge, like when a teacher tells his student of his knowledge. 
See Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, 2, q. 18. 
6 This connaturality explains the tendencies of beings to recognize or 
react to other beings: like plants that grow toward the direction of the light 
source and like the human person who feel sympathy for others. See Maritain, 
Approaches to God, 86; 88. 
7 When he explains, for example, that love for someone or something 
is possible because of a certain connaturality between the sensible appetite of 
the lover and the thing loved. See Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book 2, Lecture V. In the same text, Aquinas explains that connaturality 
is a cause of pleasure. 
8 With regard to the knowledge of the Supreme Being, Maritain cites 
Aquinas when the latter underscores that divine knowledge is experienced not 
only by the mystics who have been identified as those who vividly see the 
divine nature of things. See Maritain, Art and Scholasticism and The Frontiers 
of Poetry, 23–24. He is also fast to clarify that one need not be a mystic to have 
intuition that comes from connaturality. In proposing that intuition is possible 
for all, Maritain also suggests an approach to God. It is interesting to stress at 
this point that Maritain leads us to observe activity. He explains that for the 
human person, this approach starts from pre-rational intuition, which may come 
to operate even before thinking starts. Maritain emphasizes this approach as a 
“feeling” (Maritain, Approaches to God, 73) or the subject’s immediate 
recognition of his relation to the other contingent beings by way of, again, 
connaturality (86; 88). This signals that Maritain gives intuition a space for 
imperfection, since the person’s faculty for knowing is prone to fallibility. 
9 To demonstrate his point, Maritain reminds us that when the human 
person begins his life as an infant, the very basis of his activity is feeling. This 
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feeling, as has been said earlier, is not just the perception of the sensory organs. 
Maritain argues that this feeling is possible because of the infant’s the 
recognition of “same-ness,” which occurs when the infant starts to identify with 
his environment; he finds those which are similar to him and those which are 
not. Maritain illustrates this phenomenon by citing the immediate closeness of 
an infant to his mother. 
10 The statement is also tantamount to saying that the human person 
before his conception did not have his own nature. Only when the person starts 
to be contingent that he acquires his own personality. Nevertheless, the human 
person still retains some aspects – but only to a certain degree – of the being 
with whom it shared its existence. 
11 However, in reading Maritain’s works, we see that he puts more 
emphasis in the art emanating from suffering. Indeed, most of the important 
artworks have been borne out of suffering. To be true, according to Maritain, 
“[the world] has nothing great but its suffering; but this suffering I respect... 
Our business is to find the positive in all things; to use what is true less to strike 
than to cure.” (Maritain, Art and Faith: Letters between Jacques Maritain and 
Jean Cocteau, tr. John Coleman, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, 114-
115). This statement is in itself poetic as it gives emphasis in that there is still 
something to be appreciated in suffering. The stark contrast may seem difficult 
to accept. But the wisdom in this thought finds its justification in personal 
experiences, such as when one strives hard for a higher goal. Remember that 
sacrifices are also sufferings but they are done to attain something better. Even 
suffering is not dependent on the person, other external factors need to be 
considered. This also explains why the audience of an artwork may perceive 
other meanings in artworks, which are not intended by the artist. 
12 Consider here the fact that all beings have a nature, which not only 
gives personality to each being but also direction. Following Aquinas’s 
explanation on design, this nature allows each being to participate in the 
existence of the world. For Maritain, man comes to learn of the principles of 
nature when he realizes his actuations in relation to the beings apart from him. 
Maritain writes: “The substance of man is a darkness to himself; it is in 
receiving and suffering things, it is in awakening himself to the world that man 
awakens himself to himself.” (See. Maritain, “Poetic Experience,” para. 32). 
13 Maritain further notes that when the artwork leads to greater realities 
of the spiritual dimension, it also signifies that the natural capacity of the human 
person to communicate is exercised and the yearning to be aware of oneself is 
appeased. (See Maritain, “Poetic Experience,” para. 32). 
14 We can consider this new energy in the light of metaphors. With this, 
artists unleash another form of inspiration, even emotion, when they bend and 
blend the rigidity of mediums to provide new levels of meanings. For a constant 
reader of poetry, it will also be easy to learn that there is such a death to 
metaphors, which are commonly known as “clichés.” This particular 
phenomenon attests to the challenge to the artist of struggling to reach higher 
and further explorations of the artistic realm. It resembles a journey of the 
“perfecting of the spirit.” 
